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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
CATTARAUGUS-ERIE-WYOMING COUNTIES, 
Respondent, 
-and-
CATTARAUGUS BOCES TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
2A-10/12/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3482 
WILLIAMS, SPRAGUE & HULBURT (PETER K. HULBURT, ESQ. 
of Counsel)^ for Respondent 
D. L. EHRHART, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Cattaraugus BOCES 
Teachers Association (Association) from a hearing officer's decision dismissing 
its charge that the Board of Cooperative Educational Services, Cattaraugus-
Erie-Wyoming Counties (employer) committed an improper practice by unilaterally 
increasing the work year of unit employees from 182 to 184 days and by refusing 
to negotiate the matter. The hearing officer determined that the Association 
had relinquished its right to negotiate as to the change. 
FACTS 
The Association and the employer have been parties to a series of con-
tracts. Prior to 1976, they had negotiated four agreements which specified a 
200-day limitation upon the work year of unit employees. Throughout this 
period, the work year of unit employees varied, but never exceeded 187 days. 
During the 1976 negotiations for a one-year contract, the Association had 
unsuccessfully sought a shorter contractual work year. The 200-day maximum 
was dropped from the contract as being meaningless and the employer unilaterally 
OZj 4 J. 
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adopted a 182-day work year. The following year the parties agreed upon a 
three-year contract. During the course of negotiations leading to that con-
tract, the Association had demanded a 180-day work year. It carried this 
demand forward until the final day of negotiations. The demand was then 
dropped by the Association reluctantly because it was necessary to do so in 
order to achieve an otherwise satisfactory agreement. Moreover, the Associa-. 
tion already knew that the employer had adopted a 1977-78 calendar providing 
for 182 days, and it had been given oral assurance by the employer that during 
the remaining years of the contract there would be no "substantial" variance 
from that 182-day work year. For the 1978-79 school year, the employer 
adopted a calendar that increased the number of workdays from 182 to 184. It 
refused to negotiate as to this action. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer dismissing the charge. In 
1977, when the current agreement was negotiated between the Association and the 
employer, the length of the work year was given prominent attention. The 
Association withdrew its demand for a specific limitation on the length of the 
work year because it was satisfied with the entirety of the agreement that it 
achieved and because it was given an oral assurance that the length of the 
work year would continue to be "substantially" the same as it was in 1977-78, 
when it was 182 days. The oral agreement is part of the terms and conditions 
of employment agreed upon by the parties. The Association is not entitled to 
reopen negotiations on the demand for a limitation upon the work year but must 
live with the agreement that it would not be increased substantially. 
The sole remaining question is whether the employer violated its com-
mitment to the Association not to "substantially" increase the work year of 
unit employees when it added two days to their work year. The answer to this 
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question requires an interpretation of the commitments made by the parties to 
each other; it does not raise any improper practice issues. It should be re-
solved in accordance with the dispute resolution mechanisms adopted by the 
parties. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein.be, arid it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
October 11, 1979 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
s # ^ ~ -.. . ,„ -
Haroldyft. Newman, Chairman 
%Ld£2&&3£_^> 
David C. Randies, Member / 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the 
UNITED 
MORRIS 
Matter of 
UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS 
ESON, 
-and-
INC., 
Respondent, 
Charging Party. 
#2B- 10/12/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2951 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ., (ROCCO A. SOLIMANDO, ESQ., and 
IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ., of Counsel) for Respondent 
MORRIS ESON, pro se, for Charging Party 
The History of this Proceeding 
Morris E. Eson, an employee of the State of New York, is a member of 
the State University Professional Services negotiating unit, but he is not a 
member of United University Professions, Inc. (UUP), the exclusive representa-
tive of the employees in that unit. The charge herein was filed by Eson on 
October 27, 1977. It alleged that UUP violated §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law 
in that it interfered with his right not to join UUP and coerced him into doing 
so by taking agency shop fee payments from him without having first established 
a proper refund procedure. 
The hearing officer assigned to the case determined (11 PERB 1(4519, 
April 7, 1978) that the charge had merit in that the refund procedure was 
defective in certain particulars, one of which involved the use of an arbitrator 
at the final appellate step of the procedure. The objectionable aspects of 
this were that an employee was required to pay half the cost of the arbitration 
and that he would have only a right to a limited review of the arbitrator's 
award even though he never consented to arbitration. One of the aspects of the 
Board - U-2951 
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refund procedure that the hearing officer determined to be acceptable is that 
UUP could retain the agency fee payments collected throughout its fiscal year, 
while providing a brief period after the close of its fiscal year during which 
an employee whose agency fee payments were collected could file for a refund. 
The amount of the refund could then be calculated for the entire fiscal year 
of UUP and the money then returned to the employees who seek it. The UUP pro-
cedure called for the filing of refund applications during the first two weeks 
following the close of its fiscal year, i.e., the first two weeks of September. 
As a remedy for the defects which he found in the refund procedure, the 
hearing officer directed UUP to correct those defects. He declined to declare 
the past collections illegal and to order their return. 
Both Eson and UUP filed exceptions to his decision. Eson's exceptions 
were directed to the remedy proposed by the hearing officer. He contended 
that it was inadequate. UUP's exceptions were directed to the inadequacies 
that the hearing officer found in the refund procedure. It contended that the 
hearing officer had imposed unnecessary and inappropriate restrictions upon it. 
After reviewing the record and considering the arguments of the parties, 
we affirmed the material findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing 
1 
officer. We directed UUP to correct the deficiencies in its refund procedure 
within four weeks and retained jurisdiction to evaluate its changes (11 PERB 
1(3068, August 23, 1978). 
UUP submitted a revision of its refund procedure. The final appellate 
step of the refund procedure was the submission of any dispute involving the 
1_ Our only point of disagreement with the hearing officer related to the 
implication of the omission of the words "of a political or ideological 
nature"from the part of the statute authorizing agency shop fee payments by 
employees of the State, while those words were found in the part of the law 
applicable to employees of other public employers. That issue is not rele-
vant to the question before us. In any event, L.1978, c. 122 has eliminated 
the discrepancy. 
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amount of the refund to a neutral appointed by UUP from lists to be supplied by 
the American Arbitration Association, with the costs of this procedure to be 
borne by UUP. We determined that the revised refund procedure corrected the 
deficiencies that had been noted. Accordingly, on the understanding "that the 
submission by the respondent to the neutral party will be accomplished in an 
expeditious manner", we approved the refund procedure. That condition was 
imposed because expedition must be considered of utmost importance-in evaluating 
the reasonableness of any refund procedure. 
After receiving a complaint from Eson that UUP was not implementing its 
refund procedure in an expeditious manner, we directed that there be an investi-
2 
gation into the merits of the complaint (12 PERB 1(3053, June 7, 1979). The 
investigation was conducted by Martin Barr, counsel to this Board, as he is 
normally charged with seeking compliance with our orders. This matter is now 
before us on his report of investigation (12 PERB 1(8005, August 24, 1979) and 
upon the responses of the parties. 
Report of Investigation 
Barr ascertained that Eson filed a request for a refund on September 1, 
1978, for excessive agency shop fees collected from him during the previous 
year. The total amount collected from Eson was $250.00; on March 9, 1979, he 
received a check in the amount of seventy-six cents, representing the refund. 
He filed an appeal with UUP, and on June 19, 1979, he was informed that his 
appeal had been denied by the UUP Executive Board. Eson then filed an appeal 
to the UUP Delegate Assembly, which is the next step in the refund procedure. 
The Delegate Assembly meets three times a year. The next scheduled meeting is 
_2 UUP has unsuccessfully sought a court order prohibiting this investigation. 
The court ruled that this Board could investigate to ascertain whether there 
has been compliance with its prior order, but that it could not otherwise 
consider whether UUP was maintaining a proper refund procedure unless a new 
charge be filed, UUP v. Newman et al., 12 PERB 1(7013 (Supreme Court, Albany 
County, July 23, 1979). UUP has filed but not perfected an appeal from this 
decision. 
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in October 1979. UUP's procedures provide that the Delegate Assembly "shall 
render a decision within thirty (30) days after hearing the appeal." Only 
after the decision of the Delegate Assembly can the dispute be submitted to a 
neutral party. The secretary of UUP testified before Barr that he had no idea 
how long the further appeal to the neutral might take or what procedures might 
be followed. 
On these facts, Barr concluded that "UUP's refund procedures have not 
been accomplished in an expeditious manner as required by PERB's order of 
September 15, 1978." He recommended that UUP be required to complete all pro-
cedures, including the report of the neutral, by December 1, 1979. Another 
recommendation proposes a refund procedure for future years that would provide 
a determination by a neutral on or before May 1 of the year following the 
2 
filing of the objection. 
Responses of the Parties 
In his written response, Eson makes no comment on the substance of the 
report and recommendations. He merely indicates his availability should we 
wish to hear argument. UUP, however, has submitted a memorandum which takes 
issue with the report and recommendations. Its primary thrust is that this 
Board has no jurisdiction to consider whether the refund procedure is taking 
too long; It further argues that Barr's determination that: .the: .refuhd pro-
cedure is taking too :lbhg.is arbitrary and unreasonable. 
Discussion 
For the reasons set forth in Barr's report, we conclude that we have 
jurisdiction. 
3^  Barr also discussed other issues that he recognized were not properly before 
him in this "compliance" proceeding. His observations may be considered 
should a new improper practice charge raise similar issues. 
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Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments of the parties, 
we adopt the finding recommended by Barr that the refund procedure has not 
been accomplished in an expeditious manner as required by our Order of 
September 15, 1978. We also accept in principle, although not in detail, his 
recommendations regarding a further remedial order in this proceeding. He 
recommended that UUP be required to complete its appellate process for the 
1977-78 fiscal year by December 1, 1979 and that in future years it be com-
pleted by May 1 of the year following the filing of the objection. We believe 
that the schedule proposed by Barr may allow too little time to complete all 
the steps that UUP has adopted. We do, however, deem it essential that the 
refund procedure for one year be completed before the time to file for a 
refund the following year; otherwise, the delay is likely to discourage non-
members from asserting their statutory right to a refund. It is no longer 
possible for the appellate steps of the refund procedure to be completed in 
time to meet this requirement for applications filed in 1978. We conclude that 
January 31, 1980 is a realistic date for the completion of the refund procedure 
for applications filed in 1978. However, for refund applications filed with UUP 
during September 1979 and in succeeding years, all appellate steps afforded by 
the procedure should be completed with final decision given to the applicant by 
August 31 of the following year. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER UUP to complete all appellate steps of its 
refund procedure involving applications for 
a refund for agency shop fee payments made 
through August 31, 1978 by January 31, 1980. 
k_ For this purpose, we assume that Eson will file any appeal that he may wish 
to take from the decision of the Delegate Assembly within two weeks of his 
receipt of that decision. 
RQ7fi 
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WE FURTHER ORDER UUP to complete all appellate steps of 
its refund procedure for applications made in 
subsequent years by August 31 of the year 
following the application. 
DATED: New York, New York 
October 12, 1979 
^f&^JLjl J?. A&^9-*s 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
•^,
A
'/ 
David C. Randies, Membe 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF PEEKSKILL, 
Respondent, 
-and-
PEEKSKILL POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
RAINS, POGREBIN & SCHER, ESQS. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL, ESQ., 
BRUCE R. MILLMAN, ESQ. & MARTIN GRINGER, ESQ., of Counsel) 
for Respondent 
HARTMAN & LERNER, ESQS. (REYNOLD A.MAURO, ESQ., of Counsel) 
for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Peekskill Police 
Association (Association) to a hearing officer's decision dismissing a charge 
that the City of Peekskill (City) committed an improper practice by unilater-
ally imposing a residency requirement upon its employees. 
FACTS 
On January 10, 1977, the City adopted a resolution which took effect 
on January 13, 1977, requiring employees who would be hired thereafter to 
establish and maintain residence within the City. Gorey, a police officer in 
the unit represented by the Association, was hired by the City on January 19, 
1977. At the time when the resolution was imposed, Gorey had already applied 
for employment and was on a civil service list. When he took the civil service 
examination, the notice for that examination specified no residency requirement. 
Gorey was discharged during March 1979 because he failed to continue 
residency in the City. The charge herein was filed on February 21, 1979. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3862 
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THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION and THE EXCEPTIONS 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge because he concluded that the 
City had been free to impose a residency requirement as a qualification for 
employment. He found support for this conclusion in our decisions in City of 
Buffalo, 9 PERB 1(3015 (1976) and City of Auburn, 9 PERB 113085 (1976) in which 
we held that 'a residency requirement for persons not yet hired is a condition 
for employment and, therefore, not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that the prior Board decisions 
should be distinguished because they did not involve an employee who had alread} 
applied for the position and was awaiting appointment when the residency 
requirement was imposed. It also argues that the operative date was neither 
January 10, 1977, when the resolution was adopted, nor January 13, 1977 when it 
became effective, but March 1979, when Gorey was discharged. In support of 
this, it argues that following its adoption, the residency requirement was 
abandoned by the City by reason of the City's failure to impose it. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law of the hearing officer. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the Association's conten-
tion that the City failed to impose the residency requirement after its adop-
tion or that it abandoned the requirement in any other way. 
We also reject the Association's argument that the City was obligated 
to negotiate with it before adopting a residency requirement that would be 
applicable to persons who were not yet hired, but who had already applied for 
employment. A public employer is obligated to negotiate with an employee 
organization regarding current employees who are in its negotiating unit. It 
is under no duty to negotiate regarding potential employees except insofar as 
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the terms and conditions of employment that are negotiated for current employees 
will be applied to them if and when they are hired. As a residency requirement 
for a person to be hired is a qualification for employment and not a term and 
condition of employment, the City was under no duty to negotiate regarding the 
1 
application of a residency requirement to Gorey before he was actually hired. 
Finally, even if the City had been obligated to negotiate regarding the 
application of a residency requirement to Gorey before he was hired, the 
Association's charge would not be timely. The time during which the Association 
could have filed a charge would have passed because the residency requirement 
was adopted more than four months prior to the filing of the charge. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
DATEB: New York, New York 
October 12, 1979 
David C. Randies, Member 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
1 See Salamanca, 12 PERB 113079 (1979), in which we held that the continuing 
application of a residency requirement to an employee who has been hired 
subject to such a requirement is a function of statute (Public Officer's 
Law §30) and not negotiation. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC RMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter 
BALDWINSVILLE 
BALDWINSVILLE 
OP 
of 
.CENTRAL 
-and-
CENTRAL 
SCHOOL 
SCHOOL 
OFFICE PERSONNEL NYEA/NEA. 
DISTRICT, : 
Employer, : 
ASSOCIATION : 
• 
Petitioner. : 
#2D-10/12/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1815 
O'HARA AND O'HARA, ESQS., for Employer 
PAUL E. KLEIN, ESQ., (ZACHARY WELLMAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for Petitioner 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Baldwinsville Central 
School Association of Office Personnel NYEA/NEA (Association) from a decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
that the nine teacher aides employed by the Baldwinsville Central School 
District (District) should not be added to an existing unit of clerical 
1 
employees of the District which is presently represented by the Association. 
The Director accepted the position of the District that the teacher aides 
should be placed in a separate unit of their own. 
FACTS 
As found by the Director, the primary role of teacher aides is to assist 
teachers in their non-teaching functions. Thus, teacher aides perform such 
tasks as marking papers, typing letters, supervising the cafeteria, making 
1 The Association had proposed that, in.the alternative, teacher aides be addec 
to an existing unit of teaching assistants. The Director determined that 
such a unit would also not be appropriate. The Association's exceptions do 
not address this part of the Director's determination. 
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arrangements for field trips and obtaining supplies, and one works for the 
high school librarian. They do, however, occasionally fill in for clerical 
employees. The clerical employees perform normal clerical duties in satisfac-
tion of the administrative responsibilities of the District. They have little 
or no contact with the personnel involved in the District's instructional 
program. Their assignments are made and their work supervised by the adminis-
trators of the District, while the work of each teacher aide is assigned and 
supervised by a committee of three teachers and the building principal, except 
2 
for one whose work is supervised by the high school librarian. 
There are significant differences in the conditions of employment of the 
two groups. Teacher aides work an institutional calendar of 10 months, while 
the work year of clericals varies, some working 10 months, some 11 months and 
some 12 months. Teacher aides are in the labor class of the civil service, 
which means that they do not enjoy the job security protections of §§75 and 80 
of the Civil Service Law. The clerical employees are in the competitive class 
2 
of civil service and enjoy the protections of the Civil Service Law. Other 
differences in the conditions of employment of the two groups involve sick 
leave and holidays. There are also differences of lesser dimension involving 
vacation time and the availability of health insurance. 
Another difference between the two groups involves the qualifications for 
appointment. There are no specified qualifications for a teacher aide, although 
all are high school graduates. Clerical employees, on the other hand, must 
have clerical skills. 
2_ The aide who works for the high school librarian works more than twenty 
hours. The others do not. 
3_ One clerical employee is classified as non-competitive. 
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THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION 
On these facts, the Director determined that there was a relatively 
slight community of interest between teacher aides and the clerical employees. 
He concluded that the community of interest was not sufficient to overcome 
the District's claim of administrative convenience in having teacher aides 
placed in a separate unit. The basis for this determination of administrative 
convenience was the Director's finding that a combined unit might inhibit the 
assignment of non-clerical work to teacher aides. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association asserts that the Director erred in 
both his findings of fact and conclusions of law. It contends that there are 
substantial similarities between teacher aides and clerical employees and that 
there are significant dissimilarities within each of the two groups which make 
the dissimilarities between them less significant. It further argues that the 
Director has disregarded prior decisions in which this Board has indicated a 
preference for broader negotiating units and that he has given undue consider-
ation to the District's argument that its administrative convenience would be 
better served by separate units. 
DISCUSSION 
1 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments of the parties, 
we affirm the Director's findings of fact and his conclusion of law that 
teacher aides should not be added to the existing unit of clerical employees. 
The dissimilarities between the two groups are significantly greater than the 
dissimilarities within each, and the District's concern for its administrative 
convenience was given appropriate consideration. 
4^  In addition to submitting briefs, the parties were also given the oppor-
tunity to present oral argument. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that an election by secret ballot be held under 
the supervision of the Director among the employees in 
the unit determined by him to be appropriate who were 
employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the 
date of this decision, unless the petitioner submits to 
him within fifteen days of receipt of this decision 
evidence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of : ;. 
§201.9(g)(1) of the Rules of this Board for certifica-
tion without an election. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employer submit to the Director and to the 
petitioner, also within fifteen days of receipt of this 
decision, an alphabetized list of all employees within 
the unit determined by the Director to be appropriate 
who were employed on the payroll date immediately pre-
ceding the date of this decision. 
DATED: New York, New York 
October 11, 1979 
Newman, dhairt 
Cl^/n^t sd^i 
irman 
David 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GOUVERNEUR CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
GOUVERNEUR TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL #3549, 
Charging Party. 
ARTHUR GRISHAM, for Respondent 
WM. L. CURTIS, JR., for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Gouverneur Central School 
District (District) to the determination of a hearing officer that it 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law in that it unilaterally changed the 
length of the workday of teachers employed by it for the 1978-79 school year. 
The District also excepts to the remedy proposed by the hearing officer that it 
be ordered to rescind its directive that all teachers remain on duty until 
3:15 p.m. and that it be further ordered to "pay each teacher required to re-
main upon school premises beyond the time required by the prior practice, an 
amount equal to such teacher's salary, pro-rated by such time." In support 
of its exceptions, the District argues that both the terms of its agreement 
with the Gouverneur Teachers Association, Local 3549, charging party herein, 
and past practices establish that it was authorized to determine the dismissal 
time of teachers. It further argues that "money damages" are inappropriate in 
this case because, inter alia, they could not be calculated. 
7fZJ£-±U/±Z/ /y 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3573 
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DISCUSSION 
We have reviewed the record and read the briefs of both parties. Also 
at the request of the District, we have heard oral argument presented by the 
parties. The material facts are as stated by the hearing officer and we repeat 
the most significant of them. 
On September 5, 1978, the District unilaterally determined that its 
1 
teacher's would be required to remain in school until 3:15 p.m. Prior to that 
date, the departure time for teachers employed by the District was controlled b] 
§11.4 of the 1976-78 collective agreement between the parties and by policies 
set forth in teachers' handbooks. This agreement, which expired on June 30, 
1978, provided that, "The dismissal time of any teacher shall be subject to the 
professional responsibility of that teacher." On September 5, 1978, while the 
parties were in negotiations for a successor agreement, the District instituted 
its new policy. 
Notwithstanding the language of the prior agreement, which appeared to 
leave the dismissal time of teachers a matter for the professional responsi-
bility of each teacher, the teachers' handbooks set forth varying policies. 
The elementary teachers' handbook provided that, "Teachers are expected to be 
available at their building as requested by the administrator." The secondary 
teachers' handbook provided, "All teachers are expected to make a general prac-
tice of remaining in the building for a reasonable time after the pupils are 
dismissed...The Building Principal, with the Superintendent's approval, shall 
establish the length of the school working day." In point of fact, principals 
at three of the District's five elementary schools had established specific 
departure times for teachers. At one school, teachers were expected to remain 
until 3:00 p.m., at another until 3:45 p.m., and at a third until one-half hour 
1 In some schools the teachers actually remained beyond that time because the 
school buses did not depart before 3:15 p.m. 
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after the school buses left. The record also shows that teachers often stayed 
beyond the time when they were authorized to leave and that many had stayed 
beyond 3:15 p.m. 
On these facts, we affirm the determination of the hearing officer 
that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law in that it unilater-
ally changed a term and condition of employment of its teachers by establishing 
a uniform dismissal time for teachers. However, we agree with the District 
that a remedy of money damages would be inappropriate. The dismissal time of 
teachers in the past had varied from school to school and the time when 
teachers actually left had varied from teacher to teacher and from day to day. 
While some teachers may have had to work later under the new, unilaterally 
introduced, uniform policy, others may have even been permitted to leave 
earlier. We conclude that, on the facts herein, the remedy should not include 
back pay for any teachers. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the District to rescind its order of 
September 5, 1978 that all teachers remain on duty until. 
3:15 p.m. and to restore the status quo ante until it is 
altered by procedures authorized by the Taylor Law. 
Dated: New York, New York 
October 11, 1979 
^^TwJ%^>t_ ^ 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK), 
Employer, 
-and-
COMMITTEE OF INTERNS AND RESIDENTS, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ. (JOSEPH P. MARTINICO, 
ESQ., of Counsel)? for Employer 
IRWIN GELLER, ESQ., for Petitioner 
The question before us is whether the petition of the Committee of 
Interns and Residents (CIR) for certification as the exclusive representative 
of hospital house staff employed by the State of New York throughout the 
State University System should be dismissed because the no-strike affirmation 
which accompanied that petition on August 31, 1978, is. invalid. — The Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation determined that the affirma-
tion was invalid because CIR struck against the New York City Health and i. 
JL Section 207.3 of the Taylor Law conditions the certification of an 
employee organization upon its affirmation "that it does not assert the 
right to strike against any government, to assist or participate in such 
a strike..." 
ifz.c-±u/ J.Z/ /y 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1751 
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Hospital Corp. (Corp.)*a public employer, on January 17, 1979. 
CIR filed exceptions to the decision of the Director. While conceding 
that it was responsible for a job action against the Corp. on January 17, 1979, 
it argued that the job action did not constitute a strike because it was neither 
for the purpose of improving any employee terms and conditions of employment 
nor related to any other matters pertaining to the Taylor Law. We considered 
2 
this argument and in a decision dated August 15, 1979, we determined, "[t]he 
job action conducted by CIR on January 20, 1979 constituted a violation of §210 
of the Taylor Law." (12 PERB U3073, [1979]). 
In that decision, we recognized that the strike might indicate that the 
affirmation was not sincere when given or that, thereafter, CIR abandoned the 
posture represented by its affirmation. We ruled that in either case, the 
decision to dismiss the petition would have to be affirmed. On the other hand, 
we also recognized that CIR might be able to explain the job action in a manner 
that would persuade us that its "no-strike affirmation" was and continued to 
be the sincere position of the organization. Accordingly, we invited CIR to 
submit to us affidavits and other documents in support of the proposition that 
its "no-strike affirmation" was and continued to be bona fide. We also 
permitted the employer to submit a response. 
Of the materials before us, the most significant are the minutes of a CIR 
Strike Committee Meeting of January 3, 1979, which is part of the record 
originally made before the hearing officer, and the comments of the parties 
upon them. Those minutes repeatedly refer to a strike. In its brief, CIR 
argues that the strike referred to was not understood by it to mean a strike 
within the meaning of the Taylor Law. It asserts that it had in mind a 
"political strike" which it understood to be an expression that is remote from 
2_ CIR and the employer both submitted briefs and participated in oral 
argument. 
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the labor relations issues contemplated by the Taylor Law. Thus, it would 
have us conclude that it had a good faith belief that its action was con-
sistent with its "no-strike affirmation." 
The minutes of the January 3 Strike Committee Meeting belie this 
assertion. Item IX of those minutes states: 
"The implications of our action vis-a-vis the 
Taylor Law were discussed. It was pointed out: 
1. If invoked any identified doc could lose 
2.3 days pay for every day out. 2. Very 
rarly invoked but possible is the union's loss 
of dues check-off privileges usually for a 
very limited of time." 
CIR contends that these minutes reflect a judgment that the Taylor Law was 
inapplicable to its conduct and that the indication that it was not likely 
that the Law would be invoked merely corroborates that judgment. In support 
of this, it argues that the use of the word "invoked" merely reflects the 
"notetaker's" lack of understanding of the legal implications of the word. 
We are not persuaded by this argument. These minutes are compelling evidence 
that GIR was aware that its conduct would be violative of the Taylor Law and 
that it was placing its hopes upon what it had deemed to be a probability 
that Taylor Law penalties would not be invoked. 
On the record, we conclude that CIR either did not sincerely intend its 
"no-strike affirmation" or that it abandoned the posture represented by that 
affirmation when it struck on January 17, 1979. In either case, the petition 
herein should be dismissed. 
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WE ORDER that the petition herein be and it hereby is DISMISSED. 
DATED: New York, New York 
October 12, 1979 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
David C. Randies, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#26-10/12/79 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BINGHAMTON 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
JOHN W. PARK, ESQ.,.(BARBARA J. DELGROSS, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for the City 
CONTE & HELISEK, ESQS., for the Union 
In a decision dated March 10, 1979, the Acting Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) determined that the 
Assistant City Engineer of the City of Binghamton (City), William J. Virgilio, 
is not a managerial employee, and that the Data Processing Manager of the 
City, Dean Grimes, is a confidential employee as those terms are defined by 
§201.7(a) of the Taylor Law.— The City has filed an exception to the deter-
mination that Virgilio is not a managerial employee, while the Binghamton Civil 
Service Forum (Forum), which represents Grimes, has filed an exception to the 
determination that he is a confidential employee. 
VIRGILIO 
In support of its position that Virgilio is a managerial employee, the 
City argues that he has a sufficient role in the formulation of policy to 
satisfy the statutory standard. It contends that the Director erred in applying 
1 On May 31, 1978, the City of Binghamton filed an application seeking the 
designation of 14 positions as managerial or confidential. In his decision, 
the Director determined that only two of the employees were confidential and 
that none was managerial. The exceptions of the parties only deal with 
the determinations relating to Virgilio and Grimes. 
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too narrow a standard when, in reliance upon a prior Director's decision, 
(Beacon, 4 PERB 1(4024), he wrote, "only those employees who have a 'direct and 
powerful influence on policy formulation' at the highest level will be deter-
mined managerial under the policy criteria." The City asserts that the appro-
priate test was stated by. this Board in State of New York, 5 PERB 1(3001, when 
we ruled: 
"The term 'formulate' would appear to include not only a person 
who has the authority to select among options and to put a 
proposed policy into effect, but also a person who participates 
with regularity in the essential process which results in policy 
formulation and the decision to put such a proposal into effect." 
The record evidence is accurately summarized by the Director. It shows 
that Virgilio has supervisory responsibilities with respect to 23 employees 
2 
within the City's Engineering Department. It also shows that Virgilio was in 
charge of the City's 1978 curb and street reconstruction/resurfacing program 
and that he participates in department staff meetings at which decisions are 
made as to which streets should be repaired. He may issue construction permits 
and assists in the preparation of the department budget. The record also shows 
that suggestions that he has made concerning internal operating procedures of 
the department have been adopted. 
We affirm the determination of the Director that the responsibilities 
of Virgilio do not constitute formulation of policy within the meaning of 
§201.7(a) of the Taylor Law. This conclusion follows the application of the 
standard we articulated in State of New York, supra, no less than the applica-
tion of the test in Beacon, supra. At issue is the meaning of the phrase, "to 
formulate policy". To formulate policy is to participate with regularity in 
the essential process involving the determination of the goals and objectives 
of the government involved, and of the methods for accomplishing those goals 
2_ His determination that these supervisory responsibilities are not sufficient 
to constitute supervisory or managerial employees is not contested by the 
City of Binghamton. 
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and objectives that have a substantial impact upon the affairs and the 
constituency of the government. The formulation of policy does not extend to 
the determination of methods of operation that are merely of a technical nature. 
The record does not indicate that Virgilio participates in the 
determination of the goals and objectives of the City. Neither does it 
show his participation in the determination of the methods of operation of the 
engineering department to be more than merely of a technical nature. As the 
City has not produced sufficient evidence to establish the status of Virgilio 
as a managerial employee, its application that he be so designated must be 
dismissed. 
GRIMES 
We determine that the evidence does not support the conclusion of the 
Director that Grimes is a confidential employee. The record shows that, as 
the operating head of the City's Data Processing Department, Grimes could 
reasonably be required to produce confidential data relating to its negotiating 
posture. However, his supervisor computes the necessary data manually, because 
Grimes is an officer of the Forum and a member of its negotiating team. 
Accordingly, the City is unwilling to entrust him with such data. The 
Director was properly concerned about the predicament of the City. It has 
not assigned Grimes a duty that may reasonably be required of him, because of 
his position in the Forum and it cannot preclude his activities on behalf of 
3 the Forum unless he is designated confidential.— However, §201.7(a) of 
the Taylor Law conditions Grimes' being designated as confidential upon his 
actually performing confidential functions^ In holding that Grimes 
3 Grimes would also be precluded from participating in the affairs of the 
Forum if he were designated managerial, but there is no allegation before 
us that he is a managerial employee. The Director determined that he is 
not managerial and the Forum has not filed exceptions to that determination. 
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is confidential, the Director said: 
"To hold otherwise would effectively prevent the City from 
ever requiring Grimes to perform duties which he should .'.. 
reasonably be expected to perform." 
We share the concern of the Director, but conclude that the City must seek its 
relief from the Legislature. As presently written, the statute clearly dis-
tinguishes between employees who may be designated as managerial if they "may 
reasonably be required..." to perform certain managerial functions, and 
employees who "may be designated as confidential only if they are persons who 
assist or act in a confidential capacity...." The explicit language of the 
statute precludes our designating Grimes as a confidential employee because he 
_4 
has not been assigned any confidential duties. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER reversed so much of the decision of the 
Director as designated Dean Grimes as a 
confidential employee. In all other respects, 
the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
October 12, 1979 
Harold R. Newman', Chairman 
A^dtid^^kx.^ 
Member Klaus did not participate, 
4_ See East Ramapo Central School District, 11 PERB [^3075 (1978) , in 
which we stated in. a representation case that (at p. 3116): "the 
Board will look to the duties actually required and performed, and not 
to those duties merely listed in a statement of job duties."1 
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CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
AMERICA, 
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On August 23, 1979j Martin L. Barr, Counsel to this Board, 
filed a charge alleging that Teamsters Local 317, an affiliate 
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America. (Local 317) , had violated Civil 
Service Law (CSL) §210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, 
condoned and engaged in a strike against the Onondaga County Water 
Authority (Authority) on June 12, 13 and 14, 1979-
The charge further alleged that'out of a negotiating unit 
of 65 employees, the number of those who participated in the 
strike ranged from 52 to 'ok. 
Local 317 did not file an answer, thus admitting all of the 
allegations of the charge upon the understanding that the 
charging party would recommend, and this Board would accept, a 
penalty of forfeiture of its deduction privileges from the 
Authority for a period of five months. The charging party has 
recommended a five month suspension of deduction privileges. 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that Local 317 
violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike as charged, 
and we determine that the recommended penalty is a reasonable 
one. 
tz<f\f\ 
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WE ORDER that the deduction privileges of Local 317 from 
the Authority be suspended for a period of five 
months, commencing as soon as practicable. 
Thereafter, no dues and agency shop fees shall be 
deducted on its behalf by the Onondaga County 
Water Authority until Local 317 affirms that it 
no longer asserts the right to strike against any 
government as required by the provisions of CSL 
§210.3(g). 
DATED: New York, New York 
October 11, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David.\C..\ Randies, Member 
Member Klaus did not participate, 
STATE OF NEW- YOF~' 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELA1 NS BOARD 
#3A-10/12/79 
Case No. C-1783 
In the Matter of 
BRENTWOOD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
BRENTWOOD CLERICAL SOCIAL EDUCATION AND 
WELFARE ASSOCIATION, INDEPENDENT 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitioner, 
-and-
CIVIL.SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
BRENTWOOD CHAPTER, Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance, with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Brentwood Clerical 
Social Education and Welfare Association, Independent Employees 
Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the.employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative' for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time clericals in the 
titles of Senior Clerk Typists; Senior Account Clerks; Clerk . 
Typists; Senior Clerks; Clerks; Special Education Aides; Principal 
Clerks; Key Punch Operators; School Attendance Aides; Computer 
Programmers; Account Clerks; Duplicating Machine Operators II; 
Principal Account Clerks; and Graphics and Material Designers. 
Excluded:- All other employees of'the Brentwood Union 
Free School District. 
•Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the,Brentwood Clerical Social 
Education and Welfare Association, Independent Employees 
Association 
and 'enter into a written agreement >with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 11th day of. Qctqher, 19 79 
Albany, New York 
David C. Randies, Memfie.r 
Member Klaus did not 
participate. 
eooo 
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